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ABSTRAK
Sejak Perdana Menteri Shinzo Abe memulai periode kedua kepemimpinannya pada tahun 2012, telah
terjadi perubahan yang cukup signifikan dalam posisi militer Jepang dalam hierarki negara. Perubahan
yang terjadi hampir bersamaan dengan peningkatan ancaman di kawasan Asia Timur sejak Perang Dingin
berakhir tersebut, dijadikan dalih oleh PM Abe untuk mereformasi struktur pertahanan Jepang.
Berdasarkan dua hal tersebut, penelitian ini berupaya untuk mencari bagaimana pengaruh dari pola
hubungan antarnegara dalam kompleks keamanan Asia Timur dapat memengaruhi pola hubungan sipilmiliter Jepang. Upaya itu dilakukan melalui kerangka pemikiran hubungan sipil-militer Huntingtonian,
yang hirau terhadap ideologi sipil, pengaruh formal dan informal, serta bentuk kontrol sipil yang ada di
dalam negara, didukung dengan konsep kompleks keamanan dari Mazhab Kopenhagen yang hirau
terhadap pola hubungan serta balance of power. Ditemukan bahwa peningkatan instabilitas kompleks
keamanan Asia Timur telah mendorong para pengambil keputusan Jepang era PM Abe untuk mengubah
hubungan sipil-militernya, baik secara langsung dari persepsi elit-elit politik itu sendiri, maupun tidak
langsung melalui dorongan dari Amerika Serikat. Peningkatan instabilitas kawasan sendiri akan
mendorong negara untuk turut meningkatkan kekuatan militer, termasuk dengan melakukan perubahan
pada hubungan sipil-militernya agar kebijakan pertahanan lebih tepat sasaran demi menjamin kedaulatan
dan integritas teritorialnya.

Kata kunci: Hubungan Sipil-Militer, JSDF, Kompleks Keamanan Asia Timur, Pasal 9, PM Shinzo Abe

ABSTRACT
Since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe began his second term in office in 2012, there have been significant
changes in the position of the Japanese military in the country's hierarchy. The change that was occurred
almost simultaneously with the increasing threat in the East Asian region since the end of the Cold War,
made as a pretext by PM Abe to reform Japan's defence structure. Based on the two factors, this study seeks
to find out how the influence of the pattern of relations between countries in the East Asian security complex
can affect the pattern of Japanese civil-military relations. This effort was carried out through the framework
of the Huntingtonian civil-military relationship, which was concerned with civil ideology, formal and
informal influences, and forms of civil control within the state, supported by the complex concept of security
from the Copenhagen School which was concerned with patterns of relations and balance of power. It was
found that the increasing instability of the East Asian security complex had prompted PM Abe's Japanese
decision-makers to change their civil-military relations, either directly from the perception of the political
elites themselves, or indirectly through encouragement from the United States. An increase in regional
instability itself will encourage the state to participate in increasing military power, including by making
changes to its civil-military relations so that defence policies are more targeted in order to ensure their
sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Keywords: Article 9, Civil-Military Relations, East Asia Security Complex, JSDF, PM Shinzo Abe
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INTRODUCTION
In the early days after the end of the Cold War, the international system had almost
become a unipolar system under the de facto leadership of the United States (US).
However, after the 2008 Financial Crisis, the People's Republic of China became a rival
to the US in terms of hegemony in various regions, including the East Asia region, where
the US projects its influence through one of its allies: Japan. With a competition between
the world's two most enormous economic and military powers, the region cannot avoid
the destabilization of regional security after it becomes an arena of competition.
Apart from the US and Japan, at least two other countries are currently increasing
their military strength. The first is China. With China's rising status to become one of the
world's great powers (Pramudia, 2022), the push for dominance in East Asia is also
getting more significant. China's domination efforts often use its military power to handle
various issues, such as the military build-up in the South China Sea and the Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) establishment in the East China Sea. Second is the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea which started developing nuclear weapons in
2006 (BBC, 2017a). In 2016, North Korea produced a working atomic bomb to ward off
potential US aggression (McCurry & Safi, 2016). With the increasingly unfavourable
regional security in East Asia due to the growing strength of neighbouring countries, the
situation has become quite urgent for Japan. In addition, Japan is facing challenges to
become more independent in security matters because, so far, the country has relied on
the protection of its superpower ally. Thus, it becomes an obligation for Japan as a rational
state actor to increase its defence capabilities to anticipate regional insecurity in the East
Asia region.
One of the methods taken by Japan to anticipate this is to make changes in terms
of civil-military relations in their country. Since Japan's defeat in World War II, the
country has begun to implement policies that resemble pacifism, as stated in Article 9 of
its post-war constitution to abandon the use of force in resolving international disputes"
(PM and Cabinet of Japan, n.d.) and resulted in the demilitarization of the Japanese
military to a mere instrument of self-defence. Apart from legal or constitutional
constraints that external parties—victors of World War II—influenced, some restrictions
emerged from the view of the Japanese people themselves. Generally, post-war Japanese
society has inherited a "heritage of shame" for Japan's aggressions in World War II (Han,
2017; BBC, 2017b). A survey by Pew reflects such shame of Japan's past militarism,
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which shows that more than two-thirds of Japanese people want restrictions on Japanese
military activity (Stokes, 2015).
In 2014, Prime Minister (PM) Shinzo Abe passed a reinterpretation of Article 9,
which allows Japan to protect its allies (Smith, 2014). The reinterpretation was a
"continuation" of Japan's policy in 1998, where the lawmakers passed a regulation that
allowed participation in international peacekeeping missions (McElwain, 2015, p. 255);
the realization was Japan's involvement in the War on Terror, despite playing a noncombatant role (Wortzel, 2001). The ambition to revise Article 9 and make the JSDF a
"complete military" continued even after Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida replaced
Abe consecutively (Zhang, 2020). In case of a realization of the revision efforts, there
will undoubtedly be greater power in the military realm. Such a revision can cause a shift
in the balance of Japan's civil-military relations, as a complete military will have a more
potent lobbying ability and, therefore, more influence (Rukashnikov & Pugh, 2006, p.
139). Thus, the issue of national security is Japan's priority in the contemporary era, as
seen through the efforts to revise Article 9, at least under the leadership of the
conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians. However, there are still
opposing opinions from other parties and some of the Japanese public itself (Liff &
Maeda, 2008).
From these phenomena, the authors consider that the influence of the regional
security complex on the balance of Japan's internal civil-military relations is an important
topic to study. As previously mentioned, one of the main driving forces behind the balance
of civil-military relations is Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. However, efforts to
amend the article also can cause a shift in the balance of Japanese civil-military relations.
One is the potential for the military to gain greater power to carry out its defence duties
more flexibly without excessive restrictions from the existing constitution (Tatsumi,
2017, p. 26). The authors chose Shinzo Abe's leadership period based on several
considerations: (1) Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida had not led long enough, and (2)
in Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida's reigns, there has been no significant change from
the direction of the policy during Abe's reign. A research on regional security dynamics
and civil-military relations might be quite interesting, considering Japan's significance in
the East Asian security complex dynamics. Such a significance is described by Saltzman
(2015, p. 498-499) as amplifying the standard of security dilemma among the neighbours
due to Japan’s history with the practice of imperialism. Therefore, the main question in
this research will be how the relationship pattern between countries in the East Asian
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security complex shaped the civil-military relations of Japan under the late Shinzo Abe's
reign from 2012-2020.
In addition, this research seeks to complement previous studies, mainly due to the
absence of research linking a security complex's dynamics with the state of a country's
civil-military relations; most of the previous research emphasizes only one of the two
variables.Izumikawa's (2010) research provides the initial basis for a discourse on
contemporary Japanese civil-military relations. It explains how the Japanese Constitution
constrains its security policy and provides an overview of the pre-power conditions of the
LDP today. Then, Muhammad and Sudirman (2015) described how Abe's leadership's
first three years (in the context of him being a member of the LDP) attempted to relax
these restraints. Furthermore, Madison (2018) explains how there is support for elitist
efforts (especially the LDP) to remilitarize the JSDF, one of which is through
reinterpretation and amendments to Article 9. Al Syahrin (2018) and Shoji (2021) provide
an explanation of how the murky dynamics of the East Asian security complex have
hindered cooperation between countries and have the potential to increase the severity of
existing conflicts further. Therefore, this study attempts to bridge the discourse on civilmilitary relations (including the research of Izumikawa (2010), Muhammad and
Sudirman (2015), and Madison (2018)) with the discourse on security complexes (Al
Syahrin (2018) and Shoji (2021)). This article also serves as a situational update and
continuation of Anindya's (2016) writing on the antimilitarism strategic culture of Japan
concerning the regional security milieu.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Regional Security Complex Theory
Through Regions and Powers (2003), Barry Buzan and Ole Waever argue that the postCold War international system is more appropriate to analyse at the regional level.
According to him, there is a decline in the quality of the global penetrative interests of the
world's superpowers and the withdrawal of the attention of the superpowers into domestic
affairs, resulting in a focus on the regional level (Buzan & Waever, 2003, pp. 10-11).
Then, a region is often defined only from certain geographical boundaries. From these
boundaries, interactions often emerge from countries within a region, forming what the
Copenhagen School calls a "security complex."
Previously, in Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Buzan, Waever, and de
Wilde (1998, p. 201) defined a security complex as “a set of units in which processes of
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securitization, desecuritization, or both are closely related to each other; thus, the
respective security issues cannot be analysed or solved in isolation from one another.”
Through this understanding, we can see that the national security issue of a country is not
entirely separated from the security issue of the neighbouring countries.
Thus, in contrast to the neorealist view that emphasizes security interactions at the
systemic level, the Copenhagen School, through its understanding of the security
complex, argues that security interactions or dynamics between countries will occur more
significantly at the regional level than at the global level. A country will become
concerned about its geographical neighbours’ actions, which also incentivizes it to
cooperate with other regional actors (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 41). In addition, Buzan
and Waever also provide four variables that define a security complex:
(1) boundaries that distinguish one security complex from neighbouring security
complexes;
(2) anarchic structure;
(3) the presence of polarity; and
(4) social construction, which allows for patterns of relationships.
At least two main indicators mentioned in Buzan and Waever (2003) are helpful
in analysing the dynamics of a security complex, due to their regional nature. The first is
the relationship patterns in the security complex, which includes the amity pattern and the
enmity pattern, which shows the influence of constructivist thought in the conception of
the security complex in the Copenhagen School. Meanwhile, the second is the power
relation of countries in a region through a balance of power.

Civil-Military Relations
According to Brooks (2019), civil-military relations as a concept can be defined as the
study of the relationships between the military institution and civil society, including civil
government. However, the main emphasis is on the power dynamics between political
elites and military officials at the highest stage of the state. These dynamics are also
inseparable from external conditions, such as the existence of physical threats to the state
(Feaver, 2003, pp. 1-2); so, if there is a significant physical threat, then it can be
considered reasonable if the civilian side "gives up" some of their freedom so that the
military can more freely carry out their duties in defending state sovereignty (Diamond
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& Plattner, 1996, p. 30). Thus, the concept of civil-military relations concerns the relative
power of civilians represented by the civilian government and the military over each
other. In Huntington's (2000) view, the military should ideally be under the control of a
civilian government; it describes the liberal democratic ideas that exist in the US. The
military must act professionally to serve the government and civil society (Huntington,
2000, p. 15). Therefore, the military cannot determine and influence decision-making or
defence policies (in ideal Huntingtonian conditions) but can only have limited freedom
to realize the policies initiated by the civilian government.
Although the military is primarily an instrument of the state to defend its existence
from external threats, in Huntington's view, the military must have certain limitations.
These limitations are presented to maintain the integrity of civil society democracy, as
the military is the only party with lethal weapons and could threaten democracy; in other
words, monopolizing violence. The military also has a culture of command, which is
contrary to democracy. In the end, the civilian government and the military must reach
an agreement regarding the limits of military power, influenced by several factors.
The first factor is civic ideology. According to Huntington (2000, p. 86), the
compatibility of the ideology of civil society with the ideology of the military command
can significantly affect the balance of civil-military relations in a country. Huntington
argues that the ideological compatibility of the two can facilitate the expansion of power
and power of the military itself. He also divided the various types of ideologies into two
categories: those of civil society that were pro-military and antimilitaristic. In the first
category, namely pro-military ideology, Huntington (2000, pp. 90-93) explains that
fascism and conservatism are two examples of ideologies that support military
development more aggressively. Meanwhile, in the category of antimilitaristic ideology,
Huntington (2000, pp. 90-93) gives examples of two major ideologies, namely liberalism
and marxism. Antimilitaristic ideologies are the ideologies that aim to reduce civilian or
political power from the military and ultimately avoid wars between countries as a means
of conflict resolution (Miller, 2002, p. 8); In addition, an ideology that is opposed to
military power in the civilian realm can also be considered as antimilitaristic (Cockburn,
2012, p. 2).
The second factor is the influence of the civilians and the military. Huntington
divides influence into two categories, namely formal and informal influences; they can
impact each other. They are also interrelated with the ideological factors previously
described. Thus, the existing factors cannot be separated from each other. Formal
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influence refers to formal authority, usually confirmed constitutionally or legally, that can
take the form of authority granted by a civilian government or the form of authority
achieved by the military, such as a military junta. Huntington's (2000, pp. 86-87) criteria
regarding this authority are the relative hierarchy, relative unity, and relative scale of
military authority and civilian government. Meanwhile, informal influence refers to the
political power and influence exerted by the military in everyday life.
The third factor is the form of civil control. In the civilian control concept, there
are two types of effective civilian government control over the military as an instrument
of state defence, distinguished by the degree of authority the civilian government grants
to the military. There is objective civilian control which gives limited freedom to the
military and vice versa, namely subjective civilian control by curbing the military purely
under the political will of the ruling civilian government. The two types of civil control
illustrate the shifting trend from the previous indicators, namely changes in civil ideology
and formal and informal influences.

RESEARCH METHOD
The research uses the qualitative method. According to Yin (2016, p. 6), qualitative
research methods offer flexibility in choosing topics due to several things, including (1)
the inability to conduct experiments, (2) the lack of sufficient quantitative data, (3) the
difficulty of drawing sample limits in large numbers, and (4) the possibility to research
ongoing events (not only historical). This case study has similar characteristics to what
was described by Yin.
The data collected by the authors are primary and secondary, where interviews
generate primary data, literature studies and official documents bring about secondary
data. These data are not analysed by following any logic (either inductive or deductive)
rigidly. In the discussion section, the authors will use deductive logic because it provides
a sense of certainty more scientifically than deductively to be the primary basis for
conclusions (Yin, 2016, p. 101). Meanwhile, in the conclusion section, the authors will
use inductive logic. Inductive logic is useful in explaining how a security complex's
dynamics can affect a country's civil-military relations in order to provide an overview
that the authors feel is a novelty in International Relations. Thus, the authors are hopeful
that the conclusion of this study can be a new beginning for further research to examine
the correlation between the two variables.
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DISCUSSION
Development of the East Asian Security Complex Dynamics

Figure 1. Northeast Asian Regional Security Complex

Source: Buzan & Waever (2003).

Based on the map provided by Buzan and Waever (2003), some countries that are quite
significant in the dynamics of the East Asian security complex include China, North
Korea, and Japan, with the considerable presence of South Korea and Taiwan. All the
countries mentioned above have various affinities, ranging from geographical, historical,
to cultural proximity. In addition, there are also state actors in this region who penetrate
from the opposite continent, namely the US. The US shows its presence in the East Asian
security complex, with military bases in Japan numbering around 56,000 military
personnel and South Korea numbering around 28,500 military personnel (Asahina, 2022;
Shin & Lee, 2021). The US also frequently conducts joint military exercises with its allies
in the region, which countries such as China and the North Korea see as acts of
provocation.
Thus, the interactions between these countries will undoubtedly have quite a deep
meaning because of the proximities contained in the pattern of relationships in the form
of amity or enmity. Relationship patterns that can be amity or enmity are specific patterns
of who frightens or like who are generally drawn from internal interactions within the
region, with a combined consideration of historical, political, and material conditions
(Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 47). When talking about positive relations or amity between
the countries of the East Asian security complex, the majority of what happened also
reflected the existence of bipolarity in the region.
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The democracies in the East Asia region, namely Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,
cooperate more both (?) bilaterally and multilaterally. Meanwhile, North Korea has
almost only good relations with China in the region due to the similarities in ideology and
history, in which China had supported the establishment of the North Korea, which had a
communist regime since the previous Korean War. Such a good relationship is reflected
in statistics that 94 percent of North Korea's international trade is carried out solely with
China (Statista, 2022a). In addition, China needs North Korea as a counterweight in the
balance of power in the East Asia region (Xiaohe, 2018). Then the two countries also
have a similar history, where imperial Japan once occupied them, and they are still
demanding retribution from Japan for their actions in the past. Apart from all these issues,
one significant cooperation in the economic field involves China and Japan, namely the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or the RCEP. However, such
cooperation is still limited to the economic side and occurs at the multilateral level.
That way, the dominant relationship pattern is that of enmity, especially from the
perspective of Japan itself. Japan has relatively poor relations with China as well as with
North Korea. Said poor relations are also due to the historical background where Japan,
during the imperial period, occupied parts of China and North Korea with various
accusations of war crimes allegedly committed during the Japanese occupation. To this
day, these historical issues are still echoed by the two countries (Kwon, 2021; Xinhua,
2021).
Then, there are also significant ideological differences where Japan is a liberal
democracy, while China and North Korea are countries controlled by a single communist
party. Stemming from such a difference, China and North Korea have taken several
military provocations against Japan and vice versa. Some of the most recent are North
Korean missile tests aimed at the Sea of Japan (Kyodo News, 2022) and the increased
activity of Chinese warships in straits near Japanese territory (Liu, 2022). Likewise, Japan
responded with provocative actions in the form of joint military exercises with the US
and South Korea in May 2022 (Mahshie, 2022). Therefore, this enmity pattern is quite
dominant, coupled with negative diplomatic antics and an actual arms race in the region
(Gatopoulos, 2020).
Thus, with the dominant pattern of enmity in international relations in the East
Asian security complex, this region has relatively high instability compared to other
regions such as Southeast Asia. When referring to the stages of the security complex, the
East Asia region is still in the early stages, namely the stage of conflict formation. Buzan
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and Waever (2003, p. 173) state that the East Asian security complex will not be able to
reach the security regime or even the security community soon.
Important to discuss also is the development of the balance of power in the East
Asia region. The balance of power itself becomes an important discussion in the issue of
security interdependence between countries in a region because it becomes a guide for
policymaking of each country (Haas, 1953). As a security complex, East Asia has a
regional system that tends to be bipolar, with two major regional powers competing with
each other, namely Japan and China (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 173). Such bipolarity is
almost absolute if we consider the factor of economic strength as part of hard power.
However, if purely considering military strength alone, North Korea must also be taken
into consideration because of its nuclear capabilities, which are now worrying even Japan.
Coupled with the perception of threats from the wider Asia-Pacific region, East Asian
countries have also been involving themselves in an arms race which affects the regional
balance of power (Gatopoulos, 2020).
One country that relies heavily on the balance of power as a method of state
defence is China. In the period towards the end of the Cold War until the early decades
after, China was determined to increase its power peacefully, or what they called
"peaceful rise," by accumulating economic and military power without creating
meaningful conflicts with its rivals (Zhao, 2014, p. 379); one of them being the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) (Jaknanihan, 2022). This statement shows China's aspiration to
become a superpower, just like the US, which is now considered its hegemonic rival.
Apart from these reasons, Garcia (2016, p. 550) also states that China has considered
Japan's "normalization" as an existential threat. Normalization here refers to the existence
of Japan's remilitarization efforts, with the addition of the capabilities and capacities of
the JSDF itself. These concerns also arise due to the history between the two countries.
In the end, for these two reasons, China also managed to develop its military into one of
the strongest in the world, with the second largest number of active personnel in the world
(World Bank, 2022), and become one of the countries with the most active aircraft carriers
(Armed Forces, 2022).
Unlike China, North Korea relies more on nuclear power as a deterrence to
leverage its country's significance in the regional balance of power. Gaertner (2014) calls
it an “insurance policy” that can ensure that there will be no full-scale invasion of North
Korean territory from any party as long as the Kim regime can demonstrate its nuclear
weapons launch capability. The nuclear proliferation development began in 2003 when
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North Korea officially left the Non-Proliferation Treaty (CNN, 2003). To this day, it is
suspected that North Korea has a functional nuclear missile capability, although its
nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile is still quite doubtful (Associated Press, 2022).
North Korea's missile tests (including intercontinental missiles) also alert Japan due to
missile tests leading to the sea of Japanese territory (Davies, Sugiura, & Sevastopulo,
2022). Even so, the non-nuclear military capabilities of North Korea are doubted.
Although it has a larger number than South Korea's military, the quality of its defence
equipment is not as good as its neighbouring countries—reflecting North Korea's
relatively low economic strength (Min-Seok, 2020).
Against/in responding to the security threats from China and North Korea, Japan
is slowly starting to modernize and expand the capacity and capability of the JSDF. Japan
became the country with the seventh largest defence expenditure in the world, with a
percentage of defence spending to the gross domestic product similar to China (Isakson,
2022). Of the total expenditure, Japan's expenditure is only about one-fifth of China's
(Statista, 2022b), but we should be mindful that Japan's population is only one-tenth of
China's population and Japan's territory is far smaller in size compared to China's. The
military development that worries Japan's rival countries the most is the conversion of
Izumo-class ships to carrier-equivalent capabilities starting in 2018 during the
administration of PM Shinzo Abe.
Therefore, the balance of power in East Asia tends to be bipolar, with Japan and
China acting as two polar countries in the security complex. Both countries have a
military with high capabilities, supported by modern defence equipment and nuclear
deterrence protection (with Japan under the nuclear umbrella of the US). Although China
has far more military personnel than Japan, two factors make it relatively equal: (1)
China's territory is much larger and also has to deal with threats outside the East Asia
region, and (2) Japan has also hosted a military base of the US. Although North Korea
also has nuclear deterrence, its non-nuclear military capabilities tend to be weak
compared to the two previous countries.
Development of Japan’s Civil-Military Relations
After World War II, Japan became a pacifist country, cemented with the Article 9 of the
co-formulated Japanese Constitution. The consequence of the existence of Article 9 is
that Japan has abandoned its right to use war as a means of conflict resolution, unlike
other countries in general. Thus, Japan has no offensive military capability to carry out
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aggression outside its territory. The culture of shame and regret in Japanese society plays
an indirect part in creating such a condition. The JSDF as an institution is also referred to
by Singh (2022) as quasi-military because of the many existing constraints. Therefore, to
this day, the JSDF does not have the flexibility of the former Japanese imperialist military,
with constitutional and bureaucratic constraints; on the other hand, there was
encouragement both internally and externally for the JSDF to act professionally,
following the ideal military context of a liberal democratic society. Therefore, the military
name has the name JSDF, which stands for Japan Self-Defense Forces, which means it is
a purely defensive military force; the JSDF is different from most military institutions in
the world, which has both defensive and offensive capabilities. This uniqueness arises
because of the previously mentioned Article 9 and the pressure from both internal and
external. This section will discuss the internal dynamics that shape the balance of
Japanese civil-military relations, with Huntington's (2000) civil-military framework as
the basis of discussion.
In the civilian ideology factor, the majority of the Japanese public has held an
antimilitaristic ideology in the form of democratic liberalism since World War II,
translated into the practice of the Japanese government through Article 9 of the Japanese
Constitution. The liberal democratic agenda is also supported by educational reforms by
the Japanese civilian government, emphasizing the fondness for peace and eliminating
military subjects in education (Ong, 2020, p. 86). The result is a civil society dominated
by antimilitaristic ideologies, such as liberalism in general, following the liberal
democratic ideals of the US during the Japanese occupation. In addition, some minorities
adhere to the ideology of communism, which also opposes military rule in the civilian
realm. This antimilitaristic attitude also continued even after the establishment of the
JSDF, with public opinion wanting to minimize the use of the JSDF (Miyashita, 2006, p.
100). Therefore, the government's policy of not deploying the JSDF other than pure selfdefence until the late 20th century reflects the Japanese public's ideologies, which
antimilitaristic ones dominate.
The dominant civilian ideology of antimilitarism continued well into the postCold War era with the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, during the leadership of
PM Shinzo Abe, there have been some significant, but not fundamental, changes in which
some Japanese civil society now supports efforts to expand the capacity and capability of
the Japanese military, namely the JSDF. Even so, the public's desire or support for the
JSDF is minimal, only wanting the JSDF to become a solid defensive military force, not
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offensively. Madison's (2018, p. 3) findings also support this statement, where the
political elite and PM Abe's government failed to persuade the public to support the
JSDF's remilitarization agenda and normalization of Japan. However, the public also had
concerns over the increasing military power of China and North Korea. Kennedy (2018,
p. 74) also mentions that there has been a change in public opinion that is more positive
towards the Abe regime's remilitarization efforts, but that it has been gradual and limited;
the existence of a crisis originating from external actors can accelerate these changes.
Next are the formal and informal influence factors. In the last two decades, there
has been an increase in the formal influence of the military over civilians. PM Shinzo
Abe's government granted some powers to the military, one of which was in 2015 in
conjunction with Japan's defence ministry reform. Since then, Japanese military officials
have been able to appear directly to parliament (Muhammad & Sudirman, 2015, p. 42).
The position of military officials in the defence ministry is getting more equal, with
bureaucrats continuing to ask for inputs from JSDF military officials on Japanese defence
matters, and politicians starting to respond to input from military officials as equal to
input from the defence ministry bureaucrats themselves. Previously, military officials
could not provide input directly but had to go through bureaucrats (Schwenke, 2020, p.
4). Thus, there has been an increase in the power or formal influence of the military in
Japan with the permission of the civilian government, which was quite significant in the
era of PM Shinzo Abe. However, outside the defence and security sector, the JSDF has
almost no formal influence, especially for final national decision-making, which is still
entirely in the hands of Japanese politicians.
There is not much can be found regarding the informal influence of Japanese
military institutions on civilians. Japanese civil society, which generally has an
antimilitaristic attitude after World War II, causes this informal influence to be minimal.
In contrast to the pro-military society of the Meiji era to the early Showa, modern
Japanese society does not even consider the JSDF as a complete military. However, they
consider the JSDF a mere self-defence force (as its official name suggests); most positive
public perception of military operations outside Japanese territory came from their noncombat operations, such as providing medical assistance (Traphagan, 2012). In addition,
positive public perceptions of the JSDF also emerged because of operations to deal with
natural disasters in Japan, in which Kennedy (2018, p. 75) stated that military competence
is directly proportional to public perception. As a result, the Japanese military is more
prevalent in the eyes of the people in the non-military aid sectors than in the military
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sector itself (Schwenke, 2022). Even so, it is undeniable that the informal influence of the
JSDF is minimal, partly because military headquarters are far from urban areas, causing
the low presence or direct presence of uniformed military personnel in the daily life of
civilians (Hikotani, 2014, p. 169). As a result, military prestige, as in the samurai era or
the former shogunate, is no longer visible in modern Japanese civil society.
The last is the factor of civilian control over the military. From the early postWorld War II period of Japan until the beginning of the 21st century, Japan had such a
civilian control that made the military entirely subordinate to the civilian government.
Likewise, the earliest form of the JSDF is a police force that also serves a national security
function (Kuzuhara, 2006, p. 97). From the 20th century until the early 21st century, the
JSDF was under the total control of the bureaucracy, leaving the military institutions no
direct access to formal communication to politicians unless with the supervision of the
defence bureaucrats. The Japanese military at that time was very restrained, where
bureaucrats closely monitored strategy and tactics; thus, there has been bureaucratization
in military institutions as well (Schwenke, 2020, p. 3). Therefore, in a Huntingtonian
perspective, the government of Japan demonstrated a subjective civilian control upon the
Japanese military.
However, there have been significant changes in the second decade of the 21st
century. Since the establishment of the Japanese Ministry of Defense from the Japan
Defense Agency (JDA), the JSDF has been under the ministry's auspices. The most
significant change to the form of civilian control over the Japanese military coincided
with the reform of the defence ministry in 2015 under PM Shinzo Abe's regime.
Previously, there was no direct input from the military to defence decision-makers—the
defense minister and prime minister—without the intermediary role of bureaucrats; after
the reform, the bureaucrats and the military were on an equal footing (Pollmann, 2015).
These changes can be seen in the latest Japanese Ministry of Defense organizational chart:
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Figure 2. Ministry of Defense Organizational Structure

Source: Ministry of Defense (2022). Accessed 12 May 2022, from
https://www.mod.go.jp/en/about/index.html

In the chart, the positions of Extraordinary Organs filled by military officials,
starting from the Joint Staff as headquarters to each JSDF force, are equivalent to internal
bureaus. Therefore, in the Japanese Ministry of Defense, since the reign of PM Shinzo
Abe, the military element has been in a hierarchical equal position with bureaucrats to
provide input to decision-makers.
Thus, the reorganization is a form of diversion from subjective civilian control, as
before, to objective civilian control. Based on the writings of Huntington (2000, pp. 8384), objective civilian control can be said to be a distribution of power to respect the
military’s expertise in the field of defence and encourage military professionalism. Under
this definition, the civilian government has distributed defence-related powers to the
JSDF, a division of labour. Even so, the government and the parliament still handle the
final decision-making regarding the defence and security policy. Meanwhile, the JSDF
has the flexibility to execute policies or orders from the civil government as a client. This
flexibility also reflects the professionalism in the Japanese military, where the JSDF
carries out client requests (namely the civilian government) without being directly
involved in the Japanese national political stage. Therefore, the LDP coalition
government led by PM Shinzo Abe has given more faith in the JSDF to be more involved.
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The Influence of the Dynamics of the East Asian Security Complex on Japanese
Civil-Military Relations under PM Abe
Based on previous findings using the lens of the regional security complex concept, there
has been a decline in stability or an increase in regional security tensions, which even
started before PM Shinzo Abe took office. The argument arose based on two indicators,
namely the patterns of relations (whether amity or enmity) and the balance of power
between countries within the security complex of the East Asia region. The relationship
pattern between Japan, China, and North Korea is increasingly leading to an enmity or
negative relationship, which can also spiral into a feedback loop or self-fulfilling
prophecy of threat perceptions (Arif, 2016, p. 126). Increased tension between countries
caused such a condition, which the balance of power influences. The balance of power in
the East Asia region has undergone a significant change due to a significant increase in
China's military capabilities and the existence of North Korea's nuclear proliferation
program since the early 21st century in order to match the US presence in the region
(Sulaiman, 2020, p. 101). The changes also pushed Japan towards increasing the JSDF's
capacity to carry out operations outside Japanese territory and procuring aircraft carrier
carriers initiated by PM Shinzo Abe's regime. Therefore, Japan has been reactive to its
security environment by strengthening the JSDF.
PM Shinzo Abe's government has also significantly changed the relationship
between civilian and military institutions. Driven by changes in the perception of the
Japanese political elite in the LDP coalition, these changes both influenced and were
influenced by shifts in Japanese civil ideology. Japanese civilian ideology is now more
tolerant of its military presence, with some supporting the expansion of the JSDF's
capacities and capacities. In addition, Japan's political elites, through the government of
PM Shinzo Abe and the civilian parliament, have also given more formal power or
influence to military institutions, which are now on an equal footing with bureaucrats and
can communicate directly with policymakers since 2015. The Japanese government also
encourages the professionalism of the Japanese military by giving the JSDF power in
terms of strategy and tactics to execute government policies; now, the government is more
aware of the particular expertise of the military to provide input to the decision-making
process. Such awareness can also be seen as a shift from Japan's civil control form to an
objective form of civilian control, almost in tandem with changes in the East Asian
security complex that show greater instability:
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Table 1. Comparison Before and During Abe’s Premiership 2012-2020

Pattern of Interstate
Relations
Regional Balance of
Power

The Cold War until pre-Abe’s
Reign 2012-2020

Abe’s Reign 2012-2020

Enmity

Enmity, with higher intensity than
before
More balanced towards China and
North Korea

Japan-dominant

Dominant Civil
Ideology

Liberal democracy, antimilitaristic

Liberal democracy, antimilitaristic

Civil Formal
Influence

Bureaucracy superiority

Equality between the bureaucracy
and the military

Informal Influence
of the Military

Ignorant towards the military

Form of Civilian
Control

Subjective civilian control through
government institutions

More positive views towards the
military, with appreciations
dominant in the nonmilitary
operations sector
Objective civilian control

Military Informal
Influence

Source: Author

However, based on the relationship patterns presented by Huntington (2000, pp.
96-97), so far, there has been no shift in the pattern of Japanese civil-military relations,
which still shows the characteristics of (1) antimilitaristic ideology of society, with (2)
low military political power and (3) high military professionalism. The changes that
occurred, namely the decrease in antimilitarism of the Japanese people and the increase
in the political power of the Japanese military, were not significant, so they changed the
pattern of existing relations like countries during a war.
PM Shinzo Abe and elites within the LDP have driven changes to civil-military
relations, but the regional instability factor also became a catalyst for the attitude of these
political elites. Singh (2022) stated that PM Shinzo Abe is a leader who is reactive to
changes in the East Asia region by recognizing the threat from China and North Korea.
However, there are differences in attitudes towards the two countries. China is considered
an existential threat to Japan, especially after the second decade of the 21st century, in
which China has demonstrated military power by increasing assertiveness towards areas
in dispute with Japan (Schwenke, 2022). So, as already mentioned, North Korea is more
of a scapegoat because of its position of being easy to blame, with almost all countries
viewing it negatively. PM Shinzo Abe used North Korea's nuclear capabilities as a pretext
to advance Japan's normalization agenda, which has changed the balance of its civilmilitary relations. Such an agenda can also be seen from the previous sections of the
243

Januar Aditya Pratama and Arfin Sudirman

discussion, where gradual changes to Japan's civil-military relations occurred at the end
of the Cold War, along with China's massive militarization and North Korea's nuclear
proliferation further clouded the region in the 21st century. As a result, along with the
encouragement of nationalism and ideology, PM Shinzo Abe also used the threats from
the two countries in the East Asian security complex as legitimacy to make changes to
civil-military relations. The changes, in turn, gave more flexibility to the military with
hopes of enabling more precise defence and security decision-making with
professionalism in mind.
The changes made by the government of PM Shinzo Abe are also inseparable
from the encouragement of the US as one of Japan's strategic partners. Schwenke (2022)
explains that since Japan's defeat in World War II, Japan's national security decisionmaking cannot be separated from the inputs of the US; the difference, in the era of PM
Junichiro Koizumi and PM Shinzo Abe, they have internalized values that are in harmony
with the US' interests. As a result, in the era of PM Shinzo Abe, regional and international
security policies became more proactive per the US, which wanted more participation
from Japan in regional and international security. What is also unique is that although
Shinzo Abe wants a more autonomous and independent Japan, he has realized the
importance of an alliance with the US and its role in Japan's security so far (Singh, 2022).
The alliance has greatly benefited Japan's security because the only carrier strike group
(CSG) based outside the US is located in Japan (US Navy, 2022). Japan was also selected
to be one of six countries that could purchase the F-35 fighter from the US, which also
received technology transfers to develop its own stealth fighter (Lockheed Martin, 2022).
Therefore, there may be a change in the balance of Japan's civil-military relations,
which will increasingly give power to its military. Said change can happen if the intensity
of the relationship pattern continues to increase in the East Asian security complex, which
will undoubtedly result in regional instability. The region's instability will also increase
the perception of threat to the civilian government, political elites, and the Japanese
public, as has happened over the last two decades. According to the previous sections'
findings, in the era of PM Shinzo Abe's leadership, the perception of threat was more
pronounced on the side of political elites and the government than the Japanese public.
Even so, political elites who are members of the LDP coalition (including PM Shinzo
Abe) have successfully gained support for military-related policies, albeit on a limited
scale. The limitation is the inability of PM Shinzo Abe's government to revise or amend
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution until the end of his tenure as head of the Japanese
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government. However, the following two prime ministers from the LDP, namely PM
Yoshihide Suga and PM Fumio Kishida, continue PM Abe's ambition to revise and amend
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (Asahi Shimbun, 2021; Global Times, 2022).
CONCLUSION
So far, interstate relations in the East Asian security complex have succeeded in
influencing and even shaping the balance of Japanese civil-military relations as one of the
significant state actors in the region. Although the Cold War had ended, the instability in
the security complex increased, especially in the 21st century. From this instability, Japan
perceives two other state actors in the region as existential threats, namely China and
North Korea.
Thus, the increasing threat after the Cold War was used as momentum by the LDP,
which has dominated the Japanese political scene since its defeat in World War II. The
LDP is a right-wing nationalist party that also desires to normalize Japan like other
countries by having a military that is not only limited to minimum defensive capabilities.
Such a desire was also encouraged by the advancement of Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister
of Japan. In the second to fourth period, 2012 to 2020, Abe has shown a robust ideological
drive to make Japan be able to match the military power of its regional rivals, namely
China and North Korea. Coupled with the external encouragement from the US, Japan
wants to be more proactive in maintaining regional and international security. PM Shinzo
Abe is also said to have internalized policy inputs from the US, reflected in his security
and foreign policy legacies, that the successive PMs continue to this day.
Therefore, it has been found that there is an influence from interstate relations in
the East Asian security complex, which has also changed Japan's civil-military relations.
The changes resulted from an increase in the perception of threats from China and North
Korea directly and the encouragement of the US as a state actor to penetrate the East
Asian security complex indirectly; all of this was made possible by PM Shinzo Abe's
strong ideological drive. Hence, it could be visualized as such:
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Figure 3. Visualization of How East Asian Security Complex Dynamics Affects Japan’s Civil-Military
Relations

Source: Author

However, the changes that occurred were not as significant as the PM Abe
government had hoped due to the reluctance of the Japanese public to revise or add to
Article 9 of the Japan’s Constitution. Therfore, there has been no significant change in
the Japanese civilian ideology, which is still anti-military, which means that they do not
view the threat in the region as critical enough to change the political mindset of the
people to become more pro-military. Meanwhile, in terms of formal and informal
influence, there has been an increase on the military side; civil control has also changed
from subjective civilian control through government institutions or bureaucracy to
objective civilian control. Changes in objective civilian control are considered more
capable of improving traditional Japanese national security because the military has
become more flexible in executing orders from its clients, namely the civilian
government.
Thus, Japan as a country also changed its attitude. It used to be a pacifist country
that tended to be passive and has now become a more active pacifist, with support for
increasing military power and expanding the reach of defence and security policies. In
the end, the relations between countries in a security complex can affect the civil-military
relations of a country, although it is not the only factor.
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